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because of the seller’s lack of title. The claim that Johnstone had the right to retain
possession from the mortgagees therefore well and truly missed the boat.
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Intimation: 1862-2008
How do you intimate an assignation? The point is important because Scots law retains
intimation as a constitutive requirement for transfer. Few other legal systems still
do. In modern Scottish practice the standard method is for the assignee to send
the debtor a notice signed by the cedent notifying the debtor of the assignation and
instructing the debtor into which bank account payment should be made.1 The notice
is usually sent by recorded delivery post. The practice is, however, problematic. It
does not comply with the Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862.
The 1862 Act allows intimation to be made by posting a certified true copy of
the assignation to the debtor. The 1862 Act is, admittedly, permissive rather than
prescriptive.2 But there is no solid authority for the standard practice.3 Factoring is
more problematic still: the notices are usually stamped or docketed to invoices, often
in barely legible font and in ambiguous terms.
In Christie Owen & Davies plc t/a Christie & Co v Campbell,4 there was a poorly
drafted assignation tucked away in the terms and conditions of a wider, informally
executed, agreement. Unusually, the whole agreement was sent to the debtor, but the
putative assignee made no mention of the assignation when it purported to intimate.
The case turned on whether there had been an intimated assignation.
A. THE DECISION
The facts of the Christie case were these. The pursuers (Christies) were selling agents
involved in the sale of the first defender (Campbell)’s business. The second defenders
1 The notice purports to come from the cedent and, where the assignation is in security, usually instructs
that payments should continue to be made to the cedent. The practice is inconsistent with the decision
in Hope and M’Caa v Wauch 12 June 1816 FC.
2 Prior to the Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862, conventional intimation of an
assignation had to be notarial: the assignee’s procurator, together with a notary (who had to be a different
person from the procurator), would seek out the debtor and, in the presence of two witnesses, perform
the customary notarial rituals. At that time, intimation of an assignation was indeed intimate. The 1862
Act arrived to obviate notarial intimation. Notarial intimation, though obsolete, remains competent.
3 It might be argued that the notice is nevertheless effective because (i) it is signed by the cedent (ii) it
details what has been signed (iii) it provides the debtor with clear instructions where to pay and (iv) the
assignee serves the notice; and (v) service is certain because it is effected by recorded delivery. But these
are arguments; the point has never been decided.
4 Case no CA161/07, Glasgow Sheriff Court, 21 June 2007, Sheriff A F Deutsch, noted at 2007 GWD
24–397 affd 18 Dec 2007, Sheriff Principal J A Taylor (henceforth the Christie case).
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were a firm of solicitors. Following the sale of Campbell’s business, or at least an
assignation of a lease, Christies became entitled to commission under a Sole Selling
Rights Agreement (“SSRA”).5 The solicitors held the proceeds. Christies argued that
the solicitors were liable to pay to Christies the commission Christies had earned.
This obligation was based on a mandate granted by Campbell to Christies in the body
of the SSRA:
. . . I/we hereby authorise the vendor’s solicitors. . . to pay out of money received by such
solicitors, the fees requested by [the pursuers] . . .
Both the sheriff and the sheriff principal found that such an instruction was capable
of amounting to an assignation.6 (The soundness of that assumption may be doubted.
There are important differences between mandates to pay, mandates in rem suam and
assignations).7 Christies alleged that they had sent the solicitors a copy of the SSRA
and that this was enough to amount to intimation of the assignation. The solicitors
refused to pay.8 Sheriff Deutsch produced a detailed note, most of marginal relevance
to the case before him.9 But his decision was correct: Christies averments of an
intimated assignation were insufficient and the case irrelevant. The sheriff principal
agreed. Both opinions contain a number of points of interest.
B. INTIMATION
Intimation in Scots law has at least two purposes: (i) to provide a certain date of
transfer; and (ii) to “interpel” the debtor, i.e. to inform the debtor that payment must
now bemade to the assignee.10 Often these two functions are satisfied simultaneously.
But it is not always so: (i) can occur without (ii) and (ii) can occur without (i). It is,
for instance, possible to intimate an assignation in terms of the 1862 Act by recorded
delivery post. The date of transfer is the presumed date of delivery of the intimation to
the debtor.11 And the date of transfer is thus fixed irrespective of whether the debitor
cessus has actually received or read the intimation.12 The assignee is, on intimation,
5 Conveyancers, working for impossibly low fixed-fees, should take note: the consideration for the
assignation of the lease was £46,000. The commission £9,360.05. See para 2 of the sheriff principal’s
note.
6 See Sheriff Deutsch’s note at para 12; Sheriff Principal Taylor’s note at paras 4 and 7.
7 See G L Gretton, “Mandates and Assignations” (1994) 39 JLSS 175 and R G Anderson, Assignation
(2008) paras 3-14 ff.
8 Why the solicitors refused is not clear. If Campbell was asserting an entitlement to the commission, the
solicitors could, in principle, have raised a multiplepoinding, leaving Campbell and Christies to fight it
out. There does not seem to be any reason in principle why the solicitors – the real raisers – could not
also represent one of the claimants (Campbell) in the competition.
9 Sheriff Deutsch is interested in this area of the law: see his review of the third edition of F Salinger,
Factoring: The Law and Practice of Invoice Finance (1999) at 47 (2002) JLSS Jan/44.
10 Another important purpose of intimation is to provide the cut-off date for those defences held against
the cedent that the debtor may raise against the assignee.
11 Although, for assignations in security, the Registrar of Companies deems the date of posting to be the
date of “creation” of a charge for the purposes of s 410 of the Companies Act 1985.
12 The only reported case covering this set of facts appears to be Hume v Hume (1632) Mor 848.
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no longer subject to the cedent’s creditors, although the debtor may still pay in good
faith to the cedent until the debtor actually becomes aware of the assignation.
These basic underlying functions of intimation were not considered in the Christie
case. Ironically, in the Christie case, the intimation was unusually formal since a
full copy of the SSRA was actually sent with the purported intimation letter.13
Yet the sheriff assumed that the intimation was informal and he embarked on a
detailed search for support for informal intimation. The sheriff eventually found
support for informal intimation in two cases decided under the pre-1862 law:
Carter v McIntosh14 and Donaldson v Ord.15 At the time these cases were decided,
conventional intimation had to be notarial. Any attempt to find support for informal
intimation in these cases is not just strained but a search for the non-existent. Before
the sheriff principal, the agents agreed that the test to be applied to whether there was
intimation was that formulated by Lord Kincraig in Libertas-Kommerz v Johnson:16
. . . if there has been a written intimation to the debtor of the fact that an assignation has
been granted, the terms of that intimation must be considered, and if they are such, on a
reasonable interpretation, as to convey to the debtor that the debt has been transferred, and
that the transferee is asserting his claim to the debt from the debtor, intimation will be held
to be effectual.
The sheriff principal highlighted that there were two aspects to this test: first, the
intimation must, on a reasonable interpretation, tell the reader that the debt has been
transferred. Second, the transferee must assert his entitlement to payment.
Something should be said about the circumstances of the Libertas-Kommerz case.
Lord Kincraig’s test is not authoritative because in the Libertas-Kommerz case itself,
counsel agreed the test.17 The point was not the subject of debate, far less judicial
consideration. It is for this reason that the case is of no value as an authority on this
point. The eminence of the counsel involved (now Lords Hope and Penrose) has
given credence to the view that the concession was well made. But law reports do not
disclose the various motives in the name of which good arguments may be sacrificed.
Moreover, as in Christie, there was, in Libertas-Kommerz, no true competition.
The case involved the assignation of a claim secured by a floating charge. The
original holder did not dispute the alleged assignations (made under German law).
The liquidator did not dispute the existence of the floating charge. The question was
solely whether the assignee was entitled to the charge. There were no antagonistic
claims; rather the liquidator wanted to ensure that the creditor claiming in the
liquidation was entitled to be paid. So the point remains for both discussion and
decision whether the Libertas-Kommerz test is the correct one.
The test seems sensible enough. On the facts of the Christie case, the sheriff
principal helpfully points out that covering letters enclosing intimations should be
13 See para 6. In the sheriff principal’s view, the defect in intimation lay in the covering letter: see para 7.
14 (1862) 24 D 925.
15 (1855) 17 D 1053.
16 1977 SC 191.
17 1977 SC 191 at 205.
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unambiguous, something not mentioned in the 1862 Act. Complying literally with the
terms of the 1862 Act is not enough: the assignation may be tucked away in the depths
of 100-page document. The assignee must therefore communicate his purpose.
The Libertas-Kommerz test, however, is not a particularly helpful basis
for the substantive law of intimation. The test addresses only the second
function of intimation, namely, to inform the debtor. In both Libertas-Kommerz
and Christie there was no competition and the question was between debtor and
assignee. In Christie, agents’ submissions before the sheriff principal proceeded on
the understanding that the case turned on whether the debtor had actually read, or
could be deemed to have read, the intimation. And where there are no competitors
that might be a proper approach. But such a test says nothing about the first and
primary role of intimation which is to establish a date of transfer.
Under the Libertas-Kommerz test, there is little indication when transfer actually
occurs. Presumably it is only when the debtor actually reads, or at least actually
receives and ought to have read, the intimation. Yet, if transfer were to occur only
when the debtor reads the intimation, the Scots law of assignation would become
completely unworkable. The assignee would now have absolutely no control over the
date of transfer. As a result, the assignee would never be able to rely on an assignation
intimated by recorded delivery post (or, for that matter, even an intimation served by
a court officer in the presence of a witness) providing insolvency protection against
the cedent’s creditors. For there is never any guarantee that the debtor has received,
far less read, the intimation. No one, not even a King – as the congregation at the
High Kirk of Edinburgh so decisively showed Charles I18 – can make anyone read
anything.
All transfers, whether of real rights or personal rights or intellectual property
rights, require certainty. The justification for formal intimation rules is that, for
all they may appear cumbersome, they provide certainty. Neither the sheriff’s nor
the sheriff principal’s opinion in the Christie case, however, considers the primary
function of intimation, namely, provision of a certain date of transfer. The second
function, of information, is actually of lesser importance: for the ignorant debtor who
pays the wrong person through no fault of his own is always protected.19 So although
the sheriff and sheriff principal therefore reached the correct decision on the facts of
the case, much of their reasoning sheds little light on the general law.
C. THE DEBTOR
The sheriff held that the requirement of an acknowledgment, where intimation was
otherwise informal, was impractical:20
18 On 23 July 1637.
19 Stair, Inst 1.18.3 and 4.40.33; Erskine, Inst 3.4.3. There is statutory protection for foreign arrestees:
Debts Securities (Scotland) Act 1856 s 1. Good faith payment will be disastrous for the assignee whose
claim is destroyed (although he will have a warrandice claim against the cedent); hence the practical
importance of intimation in all legal systems.
20 Para 27 of the sheriff’s note.
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An agreement to be bound by a notice of assignation is only likely ever to be granted where
the debtor has no beneficial interest in the funds but holds them to the order of the cedent,
as in the case of the solicitor holding the proceeds of sale in a conveyancing transaction.
This statement betrays a misunderstanding of the law. Subject to the terms of the
underlying contract, the debtor who receives an intimation is never obliged to grant
an acknowledgement. This has nothing to do with “beneficial interests” in the “funds”.
The paradigm assignation is of a claim that the cedent holds against the debitor cessus.
The debtor in an obligation can never be described as having a “beneficial interest”
in his own liability. The debtor has an “interest”, of course, in paying only to a person
who can grant him a discharge. Usually this is his original creditor or an assignee who
has properly intimated. But whether this is what the sheriff intended by “beneficial
interest” is not clear. In any event, a debtor who pays in good faith to the person
he takes to be his creditor is protected. References to “funds”, meanwhile, tend to
confuse. Unless there is a competition relating to a pile of coins and banknotes (an
unlikely scenario) all references to “funds” or “moneys” are metaphorical. The true
question is one of liability: how much is owed and, importantly, to whom.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The Christie case involved a quite unsatisfactory mandate to pay in the context of a
conveyancing transaction. The sheriff and sheriff principal rightly held it could not
operate as an assignation. The sheriff’s detailed discussion of informal intimation in
factoring transactions, although interesting, had nothing to do with the case. As in
Libertas-Kommerz, the issue arose because of a plea of no title to sue. But it is settled
law that the holder of an unintimated assignation has a title to sue: the raising of the
action is itself intimation.21
For some,22 the Scots law of intimation appears archaic. Often, however, it is
with practitioners rather than with the law where old habits die hard. Scots law
has sanctioned outright assignations for over half a millennium. Why commercial
lawyers continue to appoint procurators in rem suam, mandatories or attorneys is
quite extraordinary. Some of the ambiguities that arose in theChristie case could have
been avoided by better drafting: a conveyance with a single sentence specifying what
the granter “HEREBY ASSIGNS” instead of the rather timid payment authorisation
tucked away in the terms and conditions of an informally executed contract.
The Christie case was clearly correct on the facts. The more general statements
of law, however, particularly in the sheriff’s note, should not be followed. In a case
21 The most recent discussion of the point is in Laurence McIntosh Limited v Balfour Beatty Group
Limited [2006] CSOH 197. See too Tayplan Limited v D & A Contracts 2005 SLT 195 and Slattadale
v Tilbury Homes Limited 1997 SLT 197. The same issue arose in Libertas-Kommerz, a note of appeal
from an adjudication and deliverance of the liquidator, where counsel (Mr Hope) offered to produce
the assignations in process: art 9 of the condescendence, 1977 SC 191 at 196.
22 R B Wood, “Special considerations for Scotland”, in N Ruddy, S Mills and N Davidson, Salinger on
Factoring: the Law and Practice of Invoice Finance, 4th edn (2006) para 7.36 ff. As WWMcBryde, The
Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) para 12-95 n 325 points out, this passage “ignores much
inconvenient authority”.
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involving a genuine competition, it is difficult to see how the Libertas-Kommerz
test can provide any assistance. So it may be doubted whether Scots law, in 2008,
recognises informal intimation as effective without acknowledgement. The Christie
case holds that covering letters must make state the purpose of the enclosures. The
case has little to say about the fundamental role of intimation in Scots law, which is to
establish a date of transfer.
To determine whether intimation has been validly made, two issues must be
addressed: (i) whether there is a certain date of transfer and (ii) the content of the
notice. Christie dealt with covering letters, which goes to (ii).23 Unfortunately there
remains no clear authority for when intimation occurs where, for example, notices
are lost but there is proof of posting; and how that proof would be dealt with on
competition, such as with an arrester. To satisfy (i), anything short of recorded delivery
post is unlikely to be sufficient. Importantly, it must be recognised that there is little to
be gained from trudging through old authorities for support for informal intimation.
No support can be found for informal intimation in these cases. Scots law could, of
course, survive without formal intimation. But an alternative method of ensuring that
the transfer has a certain date will have to be found.24 That is the challenge.
Ross Gilbert Anderson
The author thanks Dr Andrew J M Steven for his comments on a draft of this note.
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Lien as an Excludable and Equitable Right
Onyvax Ltd v Endpoint Research (UK) Ltd1 is the second Court of Session decision
on lien in as many months.2 The pursuers had contracted with the defenders to carry
out clinical trial work in relation to the development of a new cancer vaccine. The
contract was subsequently terminated. The pursuers sought delivery of a document
produced by the defenders containing details of the work. In response, the defenders
asserted a lien over the document on the basis that they were still owed £147,267.70
23 For an old case, see Lawrie v Hay (1696) Mor 849 where the content of the notice was sufficient to
interpel the debtor, but insufficient to prevail in a competition.
24 In other systems, where notice is not a constitutive requirement, such as Germany, certainty is achieved
by notarial execution of the transfer agreement. One solution in Scotland would be to reverse Tod’s
Tr v Wilson (1869) 7 M 1100, and hold that an assignation that has been executed before a notary
and registered in the Books of Council and Session, say, within 21 days of its date, divests the cedent
from the date of the deed, although the debtor who pays the wrong person in good faith is protected.
Intimation will still occur, but only because of the need to interpel the debtor.
1 [2007] CSOH 211.
2 The first was Air and General Finance Ltd v RYB Marine Ltd [2007] CSOH 177, for which see 270
above. The most recent previous reported decision on lien was Goudie v Mulholland 2000 SC 61.
See also Thomson Pettie Tube Products Ltd v Hogg, CSOH 4 May 2001.
